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Abstract Bayesian models have proven to accurately
predict many aspects of human cognition, but they gener-
ally lack the resources to describe higher-order reasoning
about other people’s knowledge. Recently, a number of
suggestions have thus been made as to how these social
aspects of cognition might be codified in computational
reasoning systems. This paper examines one particularly
ambitious attempt by Andreas Stuhlmu¨ller and Noah
Goodman, which was implemented in the stochastic pro-
gramming language Church. This paper translates their
proposal into a more conventional probabilistic language,
comparing it to an alternative system which models sub-
jective probabilities as random variables. Having spelled
out their ideas in these more familiar and intuitive terms, I
argue that the approximate reasoning methods used in their
system have certain statistical consistency problems.
Keywords Multi-agent probability theory  Approximate
inference  Higher-order reasoning
Probability theory is a useful and largely reasonable model
of many aspects of human reasoning and decision-making.
However, by its nature, it is geared towards reasoning
about a static, inanimate environment, and it is thus not
very well equipped to handle reasoning about mutually
adapting agents in inherently social situations such as
game-playing, war, bargaining, and conversation [3, 15].
Consider for instance the following example:
Example 1 Ann and Bob both draw five cards from a
standard deck of 52 cards with 4 aces.
1. What is the probability that Bob draws exactly one
ace?
2. Given that Ann has two aces on her hand, what
probability will she assign to Bob having exactly one
ace? Is this number less than 25 %?
3. Given that Bob has exactly three aces on his hand,
what probability will he assign to the event that Ann
assigns less than 25 % probability to him having
exactly one ace?
Although these questions are somewhat cumbersome to
formulate, they have the look and feel of math problems
with well-defined answers.
For instance, we could reason that if Ann has two aces on
her hand, she knows that there are only two aces left, and this
will influence her private beliefs about Bob’s hand. Her
uncertainty can therefore be expressed in the form of a con-
ditional probability distribution, and Bob can reason perfectly
rigorously about what this the relevant condition might be,
and what the corresponding distribution might look like.
The goal of multi-agent probability theory, whatever the
details of style and implementation, is to formalize infer-
ences such as these. Such models have often played an
important background role in game theory [1, 11] and ar-
tificial intelligence [7].
In a recent article, Goodman and Stuhlmu¨ller [18] have
proposed a different approach to this problem. The system
they propose is implemented in the stochastic program-
ming language Church [10] and models probability distri-
butions over probability distributions in terms of sampling
schemes that sample other sampling schemes.
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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate to what extent this
approach is equivalent to a more conventional probabilistic
model that defines multi-agent probability theory in terms of
probability distributions rather than in terms of individual
samples. The conclusion I reach is that there are some rather
serious consistency issues separating the two.
However, before I can present these ideas, I will first
need to briefly discuss the representation of distributions
and probabilities in Church. I will then, for reference, in-
troduce another formalism that will allow us to reason
about multi-agent probabilities directly. Having presented
these two alternatives, I will proceed to point out the dif-
ferences between them.
1 Probabilistic Reasoning in Church
Church is a stochastic dialect of Lisp which allows the user
to describe a probability distribution in the form of a ran-
dom program. For instance, if we want to define a gen-
erative model that first selects a number h randomly from
the unit interval, then flips a coin with bias h, we might write
(define theta (uniform 0 1))
(define x (flip theta))
This program defines a joint probability distribution
over the pairs ðh; xÞ in the space X ¼ ½0; 1  f0; 1g. Once
this distribution has been defined in Church, a single
sample point can be obtained executing the program once
(i.e., feeding it to the equivalent of Lisp’s eval function).
Larger samples are often more efficiently obtained by using
one of the several sampling schemes implemented in
Church under the name query. These functions use
techniques such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling to
simulate the effect of running a program repeatedly,
sometimes discarding samples that fail to meet some
condition.
Church thus allows one to sample from any probability
distribution that one can build out of the primitive random-
ization devices in the language (such as coin flips and uniform
distributions). Since the deterministic fragment of the lan-
guage is Turing-complete, this in principle allows the user to
simulate any computable probability distribution by con-
structing a random program that lies arbitrarily close to it.
1.1 Probability and Frequency
Church is not a tool for probability theory as such. The
language has no internal representation of probabilities,
expectations, or distributions, and it does not permit any
direct reasoning about such quantities inside the stochastic
programs.
This means that we cannot evaluate the probability of a
given event directly in Church. If we want to compute the
probability of some event R  X, the only generally
available option is to use one of the variants of the query
function to obtain a sample
x ¼ ðx1; x2; . . .; xnÞ 2 Xn;
and then approximate the probability of R by its empirical
frequency in this sample. This corresponds to ap-
proximating the underlying probability distribution P by






where IR is the indicator function of the event R. By
plugging in ~P in place of P in the relevant places, we can
use this approximation to compute functions of P, such as
probabilities and expectations [21, ch. 2].
Church comes with fidelity guarantees in the sense that a
value returned by query indeed is a sample from the
distribution P. However, it does not come with consistency
guarantees in the sense that any statistic TðPÞ is consis-
tently estimated by Tð~PÞ. As I will argue later in this paper,
this does not pose any problems for the estimation of
probabilities in a single-agent context, but this picture
changes radically when we instead consider multi-agent
probability theory, even with a single extra layer of
reasoning.
1.2 Multi-Agent Reasoning
In order to build a system of multi-agent reasoning using
the resources in Church, Stuhlmu¨ller and Goodman pro-
pose using several different query functions nested into
each other as a representation of multi-agent reasoning.
This way, an agent’s actions can depend on a hypothetical
execution of another agent’s actions.
Consider for instance a two-player game between two
agents, Ann and Bob, which choose their actions simulta-
neously. Ann might be interested in choosing a move
which is good given what Bob might do, so she needs to
perform some kind of mental simulation of what he might
choose. In very rough pseudocode, the query function
describing her actions could therefore be defined as
define query-Ann():
Bob’s actions = query-Bob()
respond stochastically to Bob’s actions
Similarly, Bob’s choice of actions could be follow a
probability distribution that depended on his hypothetical
simulation of Ann’s choice:
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define query-Bob():
Ann’s actions = query-Ann()
respond stochastically to Ann’s actions
Calling either of these query functions would then
unfold an infinitely deep recursion tree in which Ann’s
choice depends on Bob’s, which in turn depends on Ann’s,
which depends on Bob’s, and so forth. In order for this
recursion to eventually halt, Stuhlmu¨ller and Goodman add
a maximum depth parameter to their examples and replace
the mutually dependent query functions by an uncondi-
tional prior sampling function below this threshold.
While this system does represent a certain calculus of
mutually dependent behavior, it would be a bit of a stretch
to say that it encodes ‘‘reasoning about reasoning’’ as such.
It rather represents a method for sampling a response from
a distribution whose shape may depend on a sample of
hypothetical stimuli. In many respects, this makes the
model more behavioral than cognitive.
This also means that the system has no clean separation of
its epistemic component (reasoning about reasoning), and its
decision-theoretic (mapping beliefs to actions). This makes
it hard to evaluate the rationality of any specific distributions
over actions, or to provide a priori reasons for favoring any
specific family of stimulus-to-response mappings.
However, it is in fact possible to modify the system
slightly so that its epistemic component is isolated for in-
dependent use. As indicated in the previous section,
Church can represent probability distributions internally by
approximating them with frequency distributions. This
means that we can in fact use a nested query approach in
the style of Stuhlmu¨ller and Goodman to decide a question
of higher-order probabilistic beliefs: In order to do so, we
need to define a set of frequency distributions over fre-
quency distributions, using those nested samples to esti-
mate the probability that a given probabilistic statement
obtains.
To make this more concrete, suppose that Bob has three
aces on his hand. He then has a conditional distribution
over the two possible location of the remaining ace, either
in the deck or on Ann’s hand. This distribution can be
represented by a query function, and we can draw sam-
ples from that function to estimate probabilities related to
that distribution.
In each of the two cases Bob considers, Ann will possess
certain information about her own hand and thus have a
conditional distribution of her own representing her beliefs
about the number of aces Bob holds. This distribution too
can be represented as a query function, and she can draw
samples from this function to decide, say, whether the
conditional probability that Bob holds three aces is less
than 25 %.
However, Bob can use his own query function to es-
timate the probability of the various conditions Ann might
be in. He can thus estimate the probability that Ann’s
probability estimate is less than 25 %. In this way, a set of
nested query functions can thus be used to decide the
truth of a higher-order proposition about probabilities.
This kind of epistemic reasoning is not explicitly the
focus of Stuhlmu¨ller and Goodman’s approach. They leap
directly from the observed behavior of others to one’s own
choice of response, passing quietly over the intermediate
step of representing beliefs as probabilities. The estimation
method described here is thus a compromise between the
behavioral modeling favored by Stuhlmu¨ller and Goodman
and the more classical preoccupation with disinterested
reasoning about the state of the world.
The kind of reasoning about frequencies described here
is also somewhat cumbersome and unnatural to write out in
Church. In the following section, I will therefore introduce
a theoretical framework that will make it easier to think
about such higher-order inferences, occasionally hinting at
what the Church equivalents of these concepts are.
2 Multi-Agent Probability Theory
In order to make our reasoning about reasoning more
systematic, we will need to introduce some theoretical
concepts from the literature on multi-agent reasoning,
particularly probabilistic epistemic logics [2, 7, 19]. A key
insight from this literature is that we can think about the
sample space X as a set of ‘‘possible worlds,’’ or maximally
informed states, and an increased knowledge level as an
increased ability to distinguish different possible worlds
[13].
I will attempt to present these ideas in terms that bring
them close in style to conventional probability theory. The
presentation will be conceptually novel in that it explicitly
represents probabilities as random variables. This inter-
nalizes subjective probabilities into the system, allowing us
to compute and reason with them like any other random
variables. This means that the modal fragment of the lan-
guage reduces to a familiar and well-understood theoretical
framework, contributing a significant conceptual clarity.
2.1 Definitions
In conventional probability theory for a single agent, in-
ference is a matter of restricting and rescaling probability
distributions.
Specifically, suppose the agent starts with a probability
distribution P on a sample space X. After the event S  X
happens, the agent then throws away the rest of the sample
space and renormalizes:
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PðR j SÞ ¼ PðR \ SÞ
PðSÞ :
The conditional probabilities PðR j SÞ is thus the uncondi-
tional probability we get if we treat the condition S  X as
a sample space in its own right.
In a multi-agent setting, we cannot represent conditions
by subsets of the sample space, since this would conflate
the internal and external perspectives on the model. If we
really threw away the entire remainder of the sample space,
XnS, we would have no way of representing
mathematically that some agents might still assign a pos-
tive probability to XnS. To overcome this problem, we
instead represent an agent’s knowledge as a partition of the
sample space into disjoint information cells. The coarse-
ness of the partition then represents the granularity of in-
formation available to an agent. This will allow us to say
that an agent learns whether something is the case without
stating that it is the case.
Definition 1 A conditional multi-agent probability space
is defined in terms of the following components:
1. a sample space X;
2. a probability distribution P on X;
3. a list of partitions of the sample space, a; b; c; . . .
The distribution P is interpreted as the prior probability
distribution shared by all the agents. The partitions
a; b; c; . . . are interpreted both as a set of names for the
agents and as a representation of their knowledge states.
By definition, a partition consists of mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive classes, like tiles on a floor. A
class can therefore be represented by any of its members. I
will use the notation ½xa to denote the class of the partition
a which contains the point x 2 X.
When a is interpreted as a knowledge state, its classes
are called information cells. The information cell ½xa can
be interpreted as the set of possible worlds that agent a
considers possible when the actual world is in fact x 2 X.
Definition 2 Given an event R  X, the subjective
probability PaðRÞ is a random variable whose value at x 2
X is
PaðRÞðxÞ ¼ PðR j ½xaÞ:
We could similarly define conditional subjective prob-
abilities as
PaðR j SÞðxÞ ¼ PðR j S; ½xaÞ;
but these will not occur in this paper.
For a fixed agent a and a fixed event R, the subjective
probability PaðRÞ is thus a random variable. It can take
different values in different regions of the sample space,
but it has the same constant value inside each of a’s in-
formation cells. In the cell ½xa, this constant value repre-
sents the posterior probability a assigns to the event R
given the information available to her.
This corresponds to the fact that when the actual world
is x, all that a knows is that we are somewhere in ½xa.
Since she cannot distinguish between the various possible
worlds within this information cell, she cannot do better
than condition on the entire event ½xa. By contrast, an
omniscient agent who could distinguish every possible
world from every other would condition on the maximally
informative event fxg, thus achieving a deterministic
posterior distribution.
Note that any sample space comes with a trivial parti-
tion, fXg. This partition represents the knowledge state of
an agent who has no information at all. Such an agent will
only know that vacuous statement that the actual world is a
possible world, and the corresponding posterior distribu-
tion is thus P, the prior. This distribution can be identified
with the perspective of an outside observer of the model.
The definitions above implicitly assume that the agents
derive their posterior beliefs from a single shared prior, and
that their beliefs are probabilistically coherent [5, 6]. These
assumptions can be relaxed in various ways, as often dis-
cussed in the context of probabilistic logics [19]. Such
exotic variants are not relevant for my present purposes,
however.
The definitions above also assume the existence of a
sample space and a probability measure on that space
without explaining how those objects might be constructed.
In Bayesian statistics, it is common and very useful to
specify the distribution over such a space in terms of a
generative model that links together all the variables in the
model in a non-circular network of conditional dependence
constraints [9, 16, 17]. This idea is very important in
practice and it is one of the most salient features of lan-
guages like Church, but it will not play any role in this
paper.
2.2 Examples
Before returning to the consistency issues that are the topic
of this paper, it will be useful to discuss a few simple
examples. We start with a minimal toy example.
Example 2 An agent flips a coin and looks at the
outcome.
This situation is described by the following model:
1. X ¼ f0; 1g;
2. Pf0g ¼ Pf1g ¼ 1=2;
3. a ¼ ff0g; f1gg.
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Since the agent looks at the coin, she is able to distinguish
the two possible worlds in the sample space. The partition
a which represents her state of knowledge consequently
contains two information cells, ½0a ¼ f0g and ½1a ¼ f1g.
Consider now the event R ¼ f1g. The random variable
Paf1g has different values in these two information cells.
In the possible world x ¼ 1, it has the value
Paf1gð1Þ ¼ Paðf1g j ½1aÞ ¼
Paðf1g \ f1gÞ
Paf1g ¼ 1:
In the possible world x ¼ 0, on the other hand,
Paðf1gÞð0Þ ¼ Paðf1g j ½0aÞ ¼
Paðf1g \ f0gÞ
Paf0g ¼ 0:
These two probabilities codify the fact that when x ¼ 1,
the agent knows that x ¼ 1, and when it isn’t, she knows it
isn’t.
For an outside observer who doesn’t know whether the
coin came up heads or tails, we have
PðPaf1g ¼ 1Þ ¼ Pðf1gÞ ¼ 1
2
:
There is thus 50 % probability that a will know with cer-
tainty that x ¼ 1.
This example can also be translated into a set of
stochastic programs closer to Stuhlmu¨ller and Goodman’s
idiom. In order to do so, we first need to define a program
which represents the underlying prior:
define P():
flip a coin to select w = 0, 1
return w
We then need to define another program which models a’s
subjective beliefs. Since a possesses some information, this
program will depend on which possible world we are in:
define P_a(w):
until success:
draw q according to P()
if a can’t distinguish q and w:
return q
If, as above, we wanted to estimate the probability that
Paf1g ¼ 1, we could first sample a large number of worlds
according to P; in each of those worlds, we could then
estimate the probability that a sample from P_a(w) would
be equal to 1.
By construction, a large sample from P would contain
roughly equally many 1s and 0s. A sample from P_a(1),
on the other hand, would consist solely of 1s. A sample
from P_a(0) would consist solely of 0s.
Within the sampling error of a fair coin flip, an estimate
of the higher-order probability
PðPaf1g ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1
2
would thus in this case be correctly estimated by the em-
pirical frequency approximation, yielding
~Pð~Paf1g ¼ 1Þ  1
2
:
We now move on to a slightly more interesting example,
formalizing the problem posed at the opening of this paper.
Example 3 Assume that agents a and b both draw five
cards from a standard deck and count the number of aces.
This situation is described by the following model:
1. The sample space is
X ¼ f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g  f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g:
2. The prior probability distribution is given by
Pfðx; yÞg ¼ hðx j 52; 4; 5Þ hðy j 52  5; 4  x; 5Þ;
where hðs j T; S; tÞ is the hypergeometric probability of
finding s aces and t  s non-aces in a sample of t cards
from a population of T , of which S are aces:










3. Assuming the agents only see their own hand, agent
a’s partition a ¼ f½x; yag consists of five classes of the
form
½x; ya ¼ fðx; 0Þ; ðx; 1Þ; ðx; 2Þ; ðx; 3Þ; ðx; 4Þg;
for x ¼ 0; 1; 2; 3; 4. Agent b’s partition consists of five
classes of the form
½x; yb ¼ fð0; yÞ; ð1; yÞ; ð2; yÞ; ð3; yÞ; ð4; yÞg
for y ¼ 0; 1; 2; 3; 4.
The prior probability distribution P is given in Table 1.
Using this table, we can compute both conventional first-
order probabilities and nested higher-order probabilities.
Suppose for instance that the actual world is
x ¼ ðx; yÞ ¼ ð3; 1Þ:
Then agent a knows that b has at most one ace on his hand,
and this naturally changes her posterior distribution over
the number of aces on b’s hand. In formal terms, we can
compute a’s probability that y ¼ 1 by conditioning on the
information cell ½3; 1a:
Pafy ¼ 1g ¼ Pðfy ¼ 1g \ ½3; 1aÞ
Pð½3; 1aÞ
:
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Inserting the relevant cells, this evaluates to
Pfð3; 1Þg
Pfð3; 0Þ; ð3; 1Þ; . . .; ð3; 4Þg ¼ 0:106:
Agent a will thus assign a probability of about 10:6 % to
the event that b should have the last remaining ace on this
hand when she already holds three of them.
Note that this random variable would have other values
in other information cells. For instance, if a had drawn 2
aces instead of 3, her probability that y ¼ 1 would rise to
about 19.4 %, since there would then be one more ace in
the deck for b to draw (cf. Table 2, top).
Consider now the random variable
PbfPaðy ¼ 1Þ\0:25g:
In the possible world ðx; yÞ ¼ ð3; 1Þ, this variable has the
value
PbfPaðy ¼ 1Þ\0:25gð3; 1Þ;
which is equal to
PðfPaðy ¼ 1Þ\0:25g \ ½3; 1bÞ
Pð½3; 1bÞ
:
By the previous computation, we can see that the event
fPaðy ¼ 1Þ\0:25g obtains whenever x 2. The intersec-
tion of fPaðy ¼ 1Þ\0:25g with the information cell ½3; 1b
thus consists of the three worlds ð2; 1Þ; ð3; 1Þ, and ð4; 1Þ.
We can therefore compute
PbfPaðy ¼ 1Þ\0:15g ¼ Pfð2; 1Þ; ð3; 1Þ; ð4; 1Þg
Pfð0; 1Þ; ð1; 1Þ; . . .; ð4; 1Þg :
This evaluates to about 0.265. When agent b in fact has
exactly one ace, he will thus assign about 26.5 % prob-
ability to the event that a assigns less than 25 % probability
to the event that he has exactly one ace. He thus considers
it somewhat improbable, but definitely possible, that a
assigns a low probability to his actual situation.
3 Aymptotic Accuracy
We now turn to the statistical consistency problem which is
the main focus of this paper. I wish to point out that the
frequency approximation of probabilities, which we must
rely on in order to internalize probabilities in Church,
provides inconsistent estimates of second- or higher-order
probabilities.
Suppose therefore we want to estimate some subjective
probability
PaðRÞ;
where a is some completely uninformed agent, a ¼ fXg
and R  X is an arbitrary event. We can estimate this
probability by taking n samples from the probability dis-
tribution P defined on the space X. This prior probability
distribution is equal to a’s posterior probability distribution
in all worlds, since a ¼ fXg.
The Bernoulli theorem then tells us that the empirical
frequency of the event, ~PaðRÞ, is a uniformly good estimate
of the probability PaðRÞ. More precisely, the Chernoff-
Hoeffding bound [4, 12] allows us to quantify this differ-
ence between the frequency and the probability after n
samples by the inequality
P ~PaðRÞ  PaðRÞ
 [ e
  	 2 expð2ne2Þ:
This bound holds for any precision level e[ 0 and any true
value of PaðRÞ. The probability of committing an estima-
tion error larger than some fixed precision threshold e
converges exponentially fast to 0 as the number of samples
increases. In technical terms, this means that frequencies
are statistically consistent estimators of probabilities [8].
However, suppose we are interested in approximating
the nested probability
PaðPaðRÞ\1=2Þ:
Since a ¼ fXg, the random variable PaðRÞ has the same
value in all possible worlds, and the inequality PaðRÞ\1=2
Table 1 Prior probabilities, Pðx; yÞ
0 1 2 3 4
0 0.41345 0.21202 0.03180 0.00155 0.00002
1 0.21202 0.07951 0.00776 0.00018 0
2 0.03180 0.00776 0.00037 0 0
3 0.00155 0.00018 0 0 0
4 0.00002 0 0 0 0
Table 2 Top, the value of the random variable Paðy ¼ 1Þ in every
possible world x ¼ ðx; yÞ, with x in the rows and y in the columns
0 1 2 3 4
0 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.322
1 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265
2 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194
3 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106
4 0 0 0 0 0
Paðy ¼ 1Þ
0 1 2 3 4
0 0.051 0.027 0.009 0 0
1 0.051 0.027 0.009 0 0
2 0.051 0.027 0.009 0 0
3 0.051 0.027 0.009 0 0
4 0.051 0.027 0.009 0 0
PbðPaðy ¼ 1Þ\0:25Þ
The bars show a’s knowledge partition, indicating that she can only
distinguish possible worlds that differ on x. Bottom, the value of the
variable PbðPaðy ¼ 1Þ\0:25Þ, with bars indicating b’s knowledge
partition
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is either satisfied everywhere or nowhere. The higher-order
probability PaðPaðRÞ\1=2Þ is thus either 1 or 0. No other
values are possible.
We can estimate PaðPaðRÞ\1=2Þ by first computing an
estimate of PaðRÞ, and then deciding whether that constant
random variable is larger than or smaller than 1=2. If we
get the answer to this question wrong due to sampling
noise, our estimate of PaðPaðRÞ\1=2Þ will thus deviate
from the true value by a margin of e ¼ 1, and if we get it
right, by e ¼ 0. Our estimate of PaðPaðRÞ\1=2Þ is there-
fore either perfectly correct or catastrophically wrong.
The problem is that we have no way of telling which of
those cases we are in. If, for instance, PaðRÞ ¼ 1=2 in all
worlds, we ought to decide that the proposition
PaðRÞ\1=2 is everywhere false, so that
PaðPaðRÞ\1=2Þ ¼ 0:
However, since the estimate ~PaðRÞ will satisfy
~PaðRÞ  1=2
with exactly 50 % probability (given that n is even), our
empirical approximation will in fact lead us to make the
wrong decision half the time. For PaðRÞ close to 1=2, the
chance of making a catastrophic error may thus be as high
as 50 % (cf. Fig. 1).
This leads us to the dismal conclusion that
~Pað~PaðRÞ\1=2Þ
is a statistically inconsistent estimate of
PaðPaðRÞ\1=2Þ:
However large our sample is, there is always a value of
PaðPaðRÞ\1=2Þ for which the empirical approximation is
very likely to deviate significantly from the true value.
Hence, even when our reasoning system returns a seem-
ingly confident conclusion like
~Pað~PaðRÞ\1=2Þ ¼ 1 ðin all xÞ;
the actual result might in fact be the exact opposite.
It thus turns out that the estimation of second-order
nested probabilities is a completely different problem from
the estimation of first-order probabilities. The former has a
straightforward and statistically consistent solution, and the
latter does not. The underlying reason for this is that a
thresholding operation like ~PaðRÞ\1=2 maps the prob-
abilities ~PaðRÞ to truth values in a discontinuous way, and
discontinuous functions are uncomputable by approximate
means [14], chs. 4–5]. An approximate reasoning system
like Church can thus not be unproblematically deployed to
perform higher-order reasoning without occasionally de-
livering wrong results with high confidence.
Note also that this problem cannot be solved by using an
adaptive sampling scheme that determines when to stop by
looking at the results obtained so far [20]. When
PaðRÞ ¼ 1=2, any reasonable confidence interval around
~PaðRÞ will continue to contain 1=2 indefinitely and there-
fore not provide any firm conclusions about the proposition
PaðRÞ\1=2. Since the statistician will not know whether
this negative result is due to the probability being equal to
1=2 or merely to a lack of statistical power, the inequality
will remain undecided indefinitely. Such an adaptive
sampling scheme may thus remain undecided forever.
An example of a situation in which an estimation error of
this kind may play a practical role is a coordination game in
which two agents, a and b, try to meet at one of two a priori
equally likely places. If a simulates b’s unconditional be-
havior by flipping a coin, she is very likely to produce an
estimate which skews slightly towards one of the two pos-
sible focal points, simply by the properties of the binomial
distribution. If she makes her own choice based on a clas-
sical ‘‘hard’’ utility maximization rule, this would cause her
to choose the slightly oversampled bar with probability 1,
since this choice will have the highest payoff.
On the other hand, if she uses a ‘‘soft’’ maximization
rule in the style of Stuhlmu¨ller and Goodman [18],
sec. 3.1], she would merely be more predisposed to choose
the oversampled bar. However, even such a softmax de-
cision scheme would effectively lead to an amplification of
the sampling error, say, from 51 to 55 %. If her choice was
fed into a similar softmax decision rule for b, this would
increase the bias even more, say, from 55 to 70 %. As the
layers of modal reasoning piled up, this trend would con-
tinue, pushing the probability of one of the two meeting
places upwards. Thus, if a used a sufficient depth of modal
reasoning, or if she set the ‘‘hardness’’ parameter for her
decisions sufficiently high, the result would again be a
decision distribution that would assign almost 100 %






Fig. 1 When the sample size is large, the empirical frequency ~PaðRÞ
follows an approximately normal distribution around the actual
probability PaðRÞ. However, since estimates of higher-order state-
ments about PaðRÞ may depend discontinuously on PaðRÞ, even small
estimation errors on the first-order level may lead to catastrophic
estimation errors on the second-order level
Ku¨nstl Intell (2015) 29:263–270 269
123
However, this seemingly confident conclusion would be
based on nothing but sampling error. If the entire chain of
reasoning were repeated, the frequency in the initial sample
would lean in the other direction with 50 % probability,
leading ultimately to an equally confident conclusion in the
opposite direction. An agent using such a reasoning method
would thus reach a high level in confidence that would not
reflect the validity of the reasoning.
To illustrate this last point, we could imagine placing two
agents of this sort in a situation that would require them to
solve an unbiased coordination problem. Since their con-
clusions would ultimately go left or right with equal prob-
ability, they would fail to coordinate half the time. However,
the hypothetical reasoning they performed internally would
indicate that they should be close to 100 % sure of achieving
perfect coordination. Their reasoning would thus be incon-
sistent in the sense that it did not actually reflect the relevant
aspects of the problem they were trying to solve.
4 Conclusion
The stochastic programming language Church is an useful
conceptual tool for thinking about probabilistic reasoning,
and it clarifies in many ways the logic underlying gen-
erative Bayesian models.
The recent proposal to use this language to perform rea-
soning about reasoning in a multi-agent setting is a welcome
opportunity to merge the tradition of applied probability
theory with the more speculative tradition in epistemic logic,
which has typically focused on relatively small-scale discrete
problems. Both of these traditions, the statistical and the
logical, have potentially huge contributions to make to this
project once differences of terminology and style are
overcome.
This paper has had two goals: First, to clear away some of
the potential confusion that might arise out of the complex
Church syntax and show multi-agent probability theory can
be embedded in classical probability theory by interpreting
probabilities and expectations as random variables that are
subject to uncertainty. And second, to use this insight to
pinpoint a potentially catastrophic problem with the imple-
mentation of multi-agent probability theory in Church. As I
have explained, the thresholding behavior which is an in-
tegral part of higher-order probability statements has the
unfortunate consequence that otherwise statistically con-
sistent estimation techniques can yield statistically incon-
sistent estimates of higher-order probabilities.
I thus see both grounds for excitement and for caution.
The recent convergence of discrete logics with generative
Bayesian models opens up many new possibilities for de-
signing more realistic and practical models of human be-
havior, but without a proper theoretical understanding of
these models, the risk is high that we will design systems
that hide unpleasant surprises.
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